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NOTE AND COMMENT
CARRn:Rs-SecoND CUM.MINS AM:ENm.i:i~NT.-It was seven years after the
Carmack Amendment of the Hepburn Act of 1go6 before the Supreme Court
began that series of decisions, extending from Adams Express Co. v. Cro11inger, 226 U. S. 491 (19I3), to George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co.,
236 U. S. 278 (1915), which directly resulted in the First Cummins Amendment of March, I9I5. One has only to read those cases, reviewed in 13
MICH. L. Ritv. 590, and other notes referred to in I7 MICH. L. R.Ev. I83, to
see that the language of the Cummins Amendment was framed expressly
to undo the interpretations of the court on the Carmack Amendment, and
make the liability of the carrier just what during the years 19o6-1912 it had
generally been understood the Carmack Amendment intended it to be.
Indeed, from the decision of New Jersey Stea11i Navigatio1i Co. v. Merchants
Bank, 6 How. (U. S.) 344 (I848), to the present day there has been a contest between the courts and legislatures as to what should be the law of
liability of common carriers, the courts through one device or another opening a way of escape for the carrier from the strict common law liability,
and the legislatures, state and federal, passing statute after statute to bring
the law back to its pristine simplicity and strictness.
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Just what induced the passage, within little more than a year after the
act of March, I915, of the so-called Second Cummins Amendment of August,
I916, is not entirely clear, nor have we yet decisions enough to enable us
to know where this last act leaves the law of liability. It is fairly clear
that this act was due to a feeling that the First Cummins Amendment had
gone too far in that it had made the carrier liable for the full value of the
goods lost or injured, and according to the common law rule as to damages
and not to any agreement or so-called agreement of the shipper, Matter of
Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671, 709, but without giving the carriers any compensation for added liability due to the increased value of the goods,
McCaiell-Dinsmore Co. v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., ·252 Fed. 664, affirmed
26o Fed. 835, 253 U. S. 97. There never had been any tariff of rates based
on cost of insurance, and this act seemed to forbid making one. The shipper of goods valued at five dollars paid the same rate as a shipper of a like
quantity of goods in the same classification whose value might be $Ioo or
$I,OOO. In every case the liability for loss was the actual value of the goods.
McCormick v. Southern Exp1·ess Co., 8I W. Va. 87 (I9I7), allowing recovery
of $300 for loss of a dark Cornish cock shipped in an open crate, at the
rate charged for ordinary chickens; C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaiellDinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 97 (I920); see 20 MICH. L. R.!>v. 348, I8 ib. 79I, an
authoritative decision on that point. In view of thi;, Springfield L., H. &
P. Co. v. N. & W. Ry. Co., 26o Fed. 254; Bowman-Kranz Lumber Co. v.
Biesh, 104 Neb. I65 (I920), and such cases, holding good stipulations that
recovery shall be limited to bona fide invoice price, if any, or to value at
time and place of shipment, cannot stand under the First Cummins Act.
Some cases, like Wallingford v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., IOI Kan. 544, may
involve shipments before June, I9I5, and so fall under the Carmack Amendment, but that is not true certainly of Castoii v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co., 105
Kan. 487, where the facts show an interstate shipment on March 2, I9I6.
The decision here, however, is placed on the fact that recovery was allowed
in excess of amount claimed. The Kansas court allows full actual value
for two trunks lost, contents hidden from view and value neither asked nor
given, in Pa-y,111e v. Adams ExPress Co. (Kan. I92I), I95 Pac. 860, a shipment made August, I9I5, and therefore falling under the First Cummins
Act. To the same effect is Thompsoii v. G. N. Ry. Co. (Id. I918), I74 Pac.
607. The decision of the Supreme Court in the M cCaiell-Dinsmore case,
supra, is decisive as to all cases under the First Cummins Act.
The Second Cummins Act eliminated a provision of the first act specially
applying to goods hidden from view, see I7 MICH. L. R.!>v. I83, noting
Thompson v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., sz,pra; Tribble v. So. Express Co., III
S. C. 3I, and substituted a long proviso clearly excluding baggage from the
operation of the act, and therefore as to baggage reinstating B. & M. R.
Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97. The proviso also leaves under the Cummins
Act ordinary live stock. As such live stock is usually carried by weight,
and also sold by weight, it is evident that, through weight, value and rate
are reasonably connected in most cases, and the law is equitable. The same
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thing may be said of other commodities in which weight is the unit of value
in sale and of charge for freight. But the Second Cummins Amendment
as to all other goods except baggage and live stock has a provision which
has been said to have "apparently restored to a large extent the operation
of the Carmack Amendment as it had been judicially construed." IO C. J.
138. Whether this is correct will be in doubt till an authoritative decision
by the United States Supreme Court, but a careful reading of the language
does not seem to show that such was the intent. That could have been
brought about by re-enacting the Carmack Amendment except as to ordinary
live stock.
What Congress apparently did do was to provide that the rates of the
Carmack Amendment should apply to cases in which there is express authorization, by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, to establish and
maintain rates dependent on value declared fa writing by the shipper or
agreed itpo11 in writing as the released value of the property. This authorization the commission is empowered to make "where rates dependent upon
and varying with declared or agreed values would, in its opinioti, be just
a11d reasonable under the circumstances surrounding the transportation."
The words italicised indicate the more significant requirements that seem to
show George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., supra, is not to come
back, or, if so, that the shipper is to be safeguarded. To what extent and
how the Commission and the courts will provide for this cannot be fully
known till there are more decisions than have yet been rendered, but there
are some indications.
The Commission has several times considered the Second Cummins Act.
!ti the matter of Express Rates, 43 I. C. C. 510, it was held that the act
invalidated all limitations, or attempted !imitations, of liability in case of
ordinary live stock, "wherever or in whatever form it is found." See further, on live stock rates, Live Stock Classification, 47 I. C. C. 335. In
Williams v. Hartford & N. Y. Tra11sportatio1i Co., 48 I. C. C. 26g, rates
on soap published without the authority of the Commission were declared
unlawful. It was suggested that rates properly revised might receive attention within a reasonable time. What will be the basis for rates according
to value that will be approved by the Commission is not yet fully apparent.
The guiding principle should be the remarkably clear and accurate opinion
of Commissioner Lane in Matter of Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. 565, 9 MICH.
L. R.l>v. 236, to the effect that "a certain differential between rates which
leave the carrier's liability unlimited and rates which provide for a limited
liability is obviously proper, but the differential should exactly measure the
additional insuranc;e risk which the carrier assumes when the liability is
unlimited." The cases do not reveal that any tariff based on cost of insurance
has ever been scientifically worked out or attempted. Instead, we find such
provisions as an increased charge of twenty per cent for insurance, or of
added cost for higher valuations at so much for each hundred pounds.
Household goods are not properly valued by the hundred weight. Cf.
Ostroot v. N. P. Ry. Co., III Minn. 504 with Larse1i v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 38
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Utah 130. The Second Cummins Act puts control of this in the Interstate
Commerce Commission. A recent ruling on cost of transmission of "valued
messages" by telegraph companies approves an addition to the repeated rate
of one-tenth of one per cent of the stated values in excess of $s,ooo. Limitations of Liability in Transmitting Telegrams, 6I I. C. C. 541 (March,
1921). This is in the direction of a charge proportioned to the liability,
though far Irom a complete scientific table of insurance rates. Nothing
could be much more unscientific than the former practice of telegraph companies to charge double, or one and a half price, for repeated, full liability
messages, and then settle in full with those who pushed claims, leaving others
to the recovery provided for on the telegraph blanks. See discussion in the
above case. That notice of rates based on liability should not be merely in
filed tariffs, bnt rather in bills of lading signed by the shipper and containing provisions limiting liability, is insisted upon in Perishable Freight lnvestigati01i, 56 I. C. C. 449, 481. The most extensive and illuminating discussion by the Commission is to be found in Matter of Bills of Lading, 52 I.
c. c. 671, 708, 740.
A so-called "Uniform Bill of Lading" had been approved by the Commission as early as 19o8, and, with some later modifications, had been in
general use in a large part of the United States. Acting under the Second
Cummins Act, the Commission now orders the adoption of a new Uniform
Bill of Lading, Appendix 'B of the report, containing this stipulation as to
amount of ·liability: "If the property covered by this bill of lading is hidden
from view and the shippper has specifically stated in this bill of lading the
value of the property, no carrier shall be liable beyond the amount so specifically stated, whether or not the loss or damage occurs from negligence:
Provided, in all cases not prohibited by law, that where a lower value than
actual value has been represented in writing by the shipper, or has been
agreed. upon in writing as the released value of the property as determined
by the classification or tariffs upon which the rate is based, such lower valiie
shall be the maximum amount to be recovered, whether or not such loss or
damage occurs from negligence." Decided April 14 1919.
This note will close with a reference to the few significant decisions
already made by the courts. In Westeni Ass1wa11c.e Co. v. Wells, Fargo.&
Co. (Minn., 1919), 173 N. W. 402, the court held the express company to
liability for the full value, $1,547.99, of three fur coats, value not marked
on the box nor stated to the agent, because it was not shown the company
had obtained by order of the Commission the right to ad~pt alternative
rates based on declared Qr stated values. Buse/tow Lmnber Co. v. Hines (Mo.,
1921), 229 S. W. 451, although involving a shipment under the Second Cummins Act, follows C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaull:Dinsmore Co., 253
U. S. 97, which was decided under the First Cummins Act, and does not
note that the Second Act changes the law of liability of the First In Wells,
Fargo & Co. v. Bollin (Tex. Civ. App., 1919), 212 S. W. 283, the court finds
full value recoverable upon a shipment March 3, 1917, no receipt being issued
till several weeks after, and that never signed by the shipper. But: upon a
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rehearing, and on authority of cases decided under the Carmack Amendment, the judgment was reformed to limit recovery to the amounts stated
in the receipt, and presumably in the filed tariffs of the compan)'. The
requirement of the Second Cummins Act that the value be "declared in
writing by the shipper, or agreed upon in writing as the released value of
the property," is entirely overlooked, and, so far as appears, also the further
provision that such limitation must have been "expressly authorized or
required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission." If this decisio11
be followed, then indeed the statement in 10 C. J. 138 is correct, that the
operation of the Carmack Amendment has been to a large extent restored,
and the two Cummins Amendments, except in case of ordinary live stock,
judicially overruled. The language of the statutes is not as clear and definite
as might have been desired. But certainly there is a wide difference between
a liability limited to a lower rate "unless the shipper declares a value greater,"
upheld in the Bollin case, and a "value agreed upon in writing'' of the act.
The case of Poliakoff v. Am,;; Ry. Express Co. (S. C., 1921), 105 S. E.
744 differed from the Bollin case in that the receipt with provision for limited liability unless a greater value was declared was issued at the time of
the shipment and was signed by the shipper. Verdict and judgment for full
value on the ground that the shipper did not know or assent to limited
liability, value being neither asked nor given, was reversed on the ground
that the case was governed by federal decisions, and American Express Co.
v. U.S. Horseshoe Co., 244 U. S. 58, was decisive. But that case was under
the Carmack Amendment and could not be decisive here, unless it be that
the Carmack Amendment has indeed been restored. That such is not the
case, and that decisions under the Carmack Amendment are not controlling
now, is held and clearly explained in Lindenburg v. A11i. Railway Express
Co. (W. Va., 1921), 1c6 S. E. 884- The statute requires the declaration or
agreement as tq value to be made in writing, or rather does not authorize
carriage under limited liability, nor the Commission to provide for it, except
upon a written declaration or agreement as to value. * * * Preparation and
promulgation of regulations by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and
the posting of tariffs by the carrier conforming to such regulations, do not
alone limit the liability in any particular case." Strangely enough, this case
refers to American Express Co. v. U. S. Horseshoe Co., supra, as decided
"under the present law," and seeks to distinguish it. If it were under the
present law it would settle the question of values limited in filed tariffs in
favor of the carriers' contentions and in an extreme form, for not only
was there no value asked or given, but it -seems the tariffs were on file
only with the Commission in Washington, and not in the local office of the
company. But the shipment was under the Carmack Amendment. The
date does not appear, but the case '~as first tried in 1914, and was before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1915 (see 250 Pa. 527), so that the
shipment was before either Cummins Act had been passed.
The best considered case to date is A111erica1i Railway Express Co. v.
Galt (Miss., Feb. 1922), go So. 597, holding that even if the classification
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and tariffs be treated as authorized by the Commission, and the low rate
based on a $so valuation has been paid, yet full actual value is to be recovered where the blank space in the receipt for declaration of value has not
been filled in. After quoting from the Lindenberg case, sz,pra, the court
says: "It appears from the statute that it was the purpose of Congress to
afford the shipper full value for his loss, unless he chose to take the initiative in the manner laid down by the statute,-that is, by declaring a released
value in writing. It is left entirely optional with the shipper; the carrier
has nothing to do with the matter, other than to accept the shipper's declaration of released value in writing. The purpose of the statute is to give the
shipper the active conscious choosing whether he will pay the lower rate
and recover less than full value in case of loss or damage. If he so chooses
, he sets down in writing in the receipt the released value. On the other
hand, if he is silent, either from choice or ignorance, he pays the higher
rate, which carries with it the right to recover full compensation for his
loss." A clearer statement of what the face of the act seems to show Congress intended could hardly be made.
The courts by construction emasculated the provisions of the Carmack
Amendment as to liability of the carriers. The direct result was the two
Cummins Amendments. It is to be hoped the former course will not be
repeated, but that the straightforward, clear construction of the West Virginia and Mississippi cases will be approved. If so, then the shipper can
reasonably demand but one thing more, viz., that the Commission will
approve no rates unless they are based on a fair, properly graded charge
for insurance. It should be no more difficult to make an accurate table of
insurance rates for carriers than for insurance companies, and it is time it
was done Then if the shipper desires insu~ance, let him pay for it, at reasonable rates and after written declaration by him, not by the carrier or
by force of rules or tariffs of which he has no actual knowledge. If the
courts and the Commission give effect to the present law along these lines
it is believed the huge volume of expensive litigation about amount of recovery will shrink to almost nothing, and further statutes will be unnecessary.
Nearly all the litigation on this question that comes to courts of last resort
is a protest against the injustice of the Carmack Amendment as judicially
amended in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, z.z6 U. S. 491, down to Geo.
N. Pi"erce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U. S. 278. The amendment was
intended by Congress as a benefit to the shipper, but as interpreted by the
courts it left him much worse off than he was before on this matter of the
amount of his recovery The fight between the legislatures and the courts
has been profitable to the attorneys, but it has been expensive to the carrier,
to the shipper and to the public, all of whom have been heavily drawn upon
to pay the bills. If the carrier charges for what it furnishes, for insurance
as well as for carriage; if the shipper pays a reasonable price for what he
gets, by way of insurance as well as by way of carriage, if the public is
relieved of added expense to maintain courts and court costs in a matter
that in most cases should be readily settled out of court, it is possible attor-
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neys may find other ways to earn their living, all to the very great advantage of the country. The victories of the carriers in court have been Pyrrhic
victories, and their cost might far better have been used to pay shippers in
full for losses suffered by the fault of the carrier. It is no hardship to
require the carrier to pay insurance losses if he is allowed to charge proper
prices for such insurance. His prices in the past have not been proper.
The shipper has no case if, being offered insurance at proper prices, he
consciously chooses to ship at his own risk. He has felt aggrieved, and
will continue to do so if he is overcharged for insurance, or if he is not
informed of the choice that is offered to him. The Second Cummins Act
reasonably interpreted offers a sane and peaceful solution.
E. C. G.

IMMUNl'l'Y OF S'l'A'l'S SHIPS ENGAGED IN CoMMERCE.-The subject of the
immunity which foreign sovereign states and the property of such states
shall enjoy in our courts has always given judges a great deal of trouble.
Although confronted with an almost hopeless confusion of opinion found
in treatises on international law and decided cases, Judge Mack, in a recent
case, The Pesaro (D. C., S. D., N. Y., Oct. l, 1921, Supp. Op., Dec. 13,
1921), 277 Fed. 473, has probably made a creditable contribution to the
solution of some of the difficulties. The steamship Pesaro was owned by
the kingdom of Italy and manned by civilian officers and crew under the
direction of the ministry for railway and marifime transportation. She
was engaged in ordinary commercial trade carrying passengers and goods
for hire, the vessel being in no way connected with the Italian navy. This
action was a libel 111 rem against the ship to enforce a claim for damages
to a cargo of olive oil shipped thereon. The case had already been to the
Supreme Court (The Pesaro, 255 U. S. 216), where it was ruled that the
Italian ambassador's direct suggestion that the ship was owned by the Italian
government must be made through diplomatic channels of our government.
Only one question remained for the district court to decide, and it was held
that an ordinary merchant vessel owned, operated and in the possession of
a foreign sovereign state and engaged in carrying passengers and cargo for
hire is not immune from arrest on process from the admiralty courts of
the United States, especially in view of the fact that a vessel of the United
States in like circumstances would not be immune in the courts of that
foreign state.
The leading English case dealing with this problem is The Parlement
Beige (188o), 5 P. D. 197· The suit was iii rem against an unarmed mail
packet owned by Belgium and officered by officers of the royal Belgian navy,
to recover for damages caused by collision. Besides carrying mail, the ship
carried merchandise and passengers for htre. That a foreign sovereign
could not be directly impleaded, in either private or official capacity, would
seem clear. See Mighell v. Sultan of Johore [1894], l Q. B. 149; Duke of
Brunswick v. King of Ha11over, 6 Beav. I; 2 H. L. l. In the Parlement

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Belge the court said: "The real principle on which the exemption of every
sovereign from the jurisdiction of every court has been deduced is that the
exercise of such jurisdiction would be incompatible with his regal dignity
-that is to say, with his absolute independence of every superior authority."
And in holding that the court had no jurisdiction, Brett, L. J., said, "* * *
as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority
and of the international comity, * * * each and every one declines to exercise by means of any of its courts, any of its territorial jurisdiction over
the person of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state, or over the
public property of any state which is destined to its public use." The vice
inherent in the action iii rem was that it impleaded the sovereign indirectly
so as to "call upon him to sacrifice either his property or his independence."
The court considered the ExchaJige, an American case, a good precedent.
See also The Jassy (19o6), P. 270.
Before dealing with the later English cases we shall consider the
Schooner Exchange v. lVI,'Faddon (1812), 7 Cr. n6. This was a libel brought
by American citizens against the Exchange, an armed public vessel of
France lying in the port of Philadelphia. It was claimed on behalf of the
ship that the court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the title of an armed
national vessel of a foreign sovereign. Chief Justice Marshall had no
decided cases to look to. The writers on international law gave practically
no aid. The court reasoned that the jurisdiction of each sovereign state
was absolute within its own territory, but by keeping our ports open to the
public ships of foreign friendly powers we gave an implied assent to
immunity from arrest. Jurisdiction was denied.
Although usually citing the Parlement Belge as a precedent, the later
English cases have gone far beyond that decision. In The Porto Alexandre
[1920], P. 30, the facts were substantially like those in the Pesaro. The
Porto Alexandre, a lawful prize of war, was used by Portugal for ordinary
trading voyages, earning freight. While on a commercial voyage she went
aground and was salvaged by tug-boats of the plaintiffs. In holding that
she was immune from arrest for compensation for salvage, Scrutton, L. J.,
remarked, "* * * no one can shut his eyes, now that the fashion of nationalization is in the air, to the fact that many states are trading, or are about
to trade, with ships belonging to themselves; and if these national ships
wander about without liabilities, many trading affairs will become difficult;
but it seems to me the remedy is not in these courts. The Parlement Belge
excludes remedies in these courts." But it would seem that a real distinction
lies in the fact that the Parlement Beige was serving a public purpose in
carrying the mails, whereas the Porto Alexandre was a national ship on a
purely commercial venture. The courts have sometimes expressed opinions
to the effect that this may make a vital difference. These we shall now
consider.
The Charkieh, L. R. 4 A. & E. 59, was decided before the Parlement
Belge. The action was iii rem against the ship for a tort (collision). The
ship was owned by the Khedive of Egypt in the capacity of ruler, and was
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engaged in a mere commercial venture. It was held that the court had
jurisdiction. While the decision may be based upon the finding that the
Khedive was not the ruler of a sovereign state, Sir Robert Phillimore
believed the case could be decided on another ground. "I must say that if
ever there was a case in which t_he alleged sovereign (to use the language
of Bynkershoek) was 'strenue mercatorem agens,' or in which, as Lord
Stowell says, he ought to 'traffick on the common principles that other
traders traffick,' it is the present case." He believed that warships were
immune because in a fair sense connected with the "jus c9ronae" of the
foreign sovereign. In the Prins Frederik (1820), 2 Dod. 451, the action
was in rem for the salvaging of an armed vessel of The Nttherlands being
used in time of peace for ordinary commerce. There was a compromise
without adjudication of the jurisdictional question raised. The Advocate
of the Admiralty who defended the ship pointed out that the civilians
regarded immunity as extending only to things "extra commercimn, and
qziornm non est commercizem, and in a general enumeration are denominated
sacra, religiosa, publica-pzeblicis 11sib11s destinata;' and that ships of war
were therefore exempt. The Co11ms (1816), an unreported case referred
to in the Prinz Frederik, had already decided that there was no action
against a warship for salvage. In The Swift (1813), l Dod. 320, Sir William Scott intimated that if the sovereign's vessel was used for commercial
purposes there should be no immunity. "Some sovereigns have a monopoly
of certain commodities, in which they traffic on the common principle that
other traders traffic; and if the King of England so possessed and so exercised any monopoly, I am not prepared to say that he must not conform his
traffic to the general rules by which all trade is regulated." But it was held
that there was no violation of the Navigation Act, so the action in rem
against government-owned army food was dismissed. In a foot-note to
the Swift there is a shorthand writer's account of Foster v. Herries, decided
in the Court of Exch., 24th June, 1782. In that case the cargo and goods
were condemned, but it is far from clear that the goods were the property
of the crown.
However, if one suffers the loss of his own ship by reason of the tort
of the commander of His Majesty's ship, the injured party is not without
legal redress. In The Mentor (1799), l Rob. 179, the court said that an
action will lie against the officer in immediate command of the offending
ship, that person being the actual wrongdoer. The Athol, l W. Rob. Rep.
374 is to the same effect. Taking cognizance of the fact that the loss is
usually great and the wrongdoer often impecunious, we may doubt the
efficacy of this remedy. But the Athol assures us that this is certainly the
correct one, for Dr. Lushington was able to "recollect a case where damages were recovered against an officer in command of one of Her Majesty's
ships of war, who had unjustly seized a ship in time of peace, and the
officer was obliged to fly the country."
The American decisions subsequent to the Exclumge have followed a
rather devious course. In Briggs v. The Lightships, I I Allen 157, the peti-
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tioner brought an action against three ships owned by the United States,
claiming a lien for labor and materials furnished in their construction
before they became government property. The ships were to be used by
the government as floating lights in the Potomac. Jurisdiction was denied,
the ground being the public nature of the service to be rendered. An earlier
case, The Revemu Cutter No. I, 2I Law Reporter 28I (armed patrol boats),
took the opposite view, the court being of the opinion that the United States
fared no better than an individual if owning property subject to a lien.
Where the property of a sovereign state is not also in its possession,
our courts have often held that such propertyi may be retained by the lienor,
and it is not immune from arrest by process iii rem to enforce a lien, even
though it be destined for a public use. U. S. v. Wilder, 3 Sumner 3o8
(trover by U. S., failed); The Davis, 10 Wall. IS (U. S. property in carrier's possession); Long v. Tampico, 16 Fed. 491 (Mexican public-owned
ships being delivered to that government); The Johnso1i Lighterage Co.
No. 24 (1916), 231 Fed. 365 (Russian munitions of war in carrier's possession arrested by process 11i rem). In U. S. v. Wilder, sttPra, Story expressed
the view that since a sovereign state could not be directly impleaded there
was good reason for holding that action iii rem be permitted, and by allowing this remedy (with exceptions where instruments of war were involved),
"the public policy will be promoted, and not impugned."
The English courts have held that ships which are not the property of
a foreign sovereign state, but are chartered or requisitioned by it, or otherwise in its occupation, may not be arrested by process of the admiralty
court; but proceedings in personam against the owner of the ship, and proceedings iii rem are unaffected, and a maritime lien or a judgment ii~ rem
may be enforced as soon as the occupation of the sovereign state comes to
an end. The Broadmay11e [1916], P. 64; Messicano (1916), 32 T. L. R. 519;
The Crimdoii ( 1918), 35 T. L. R. 81. Compare The Annette: The Dora
(1919), 88 L. J. P. 107, and see 18 MICH. L. Rsv. 531. The American
decisions of this class have not reached uniform results. The Attualita
(1916), 238 Fed. 909, was a ship requisitioned by the Italian government
for commercial purposes, but manned by its owners. Arrest by process
in rem for a tort was allowed, the foreign sovereign thus beirig effectively
deprived of the use of tlte vessel. The facts in Maru Nav. Co. v. Societa
Commerciale Italia11a Di Navigation (1921), 271 Fed. 97, were essentially
like those in the Attualita. The ship was attached in an action ii~ p-erso11am
against the real owner. See also The Beaverton (1919), 273 Fed. 539
(under charter of foreign sovereign). The Roseric (1918), 254 Fed. 154
(ship requisitioned by British government), is in conflict with the Attiwlita.
Three federal court decisions have dealt with the problem of the Pesaro,
each holding that the ship" of the foreign sovereign was immune from
process iii rem, even though engaged in a mere commercial venture. The
Maipo, 252 Fed. 627; 259 Fed. 367 (tort); Carlo Ponza, 259 Fed. 369.
One writer, at least, has taken the view lhat all property of a foreign
sovereign, including his ships of war, should be liable in the courts of
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another sovereign. BYNKERSHOEK, DE FoRo LEGATORUM, cap. iv, OPERA
MrnoRA, ed. I752, p. 448. See MARTENS ON LAW oF NATIONS, Bk. 4, ch. 5,
s. 9. Hall takes the opposite view. HAI,I,'s IN'l.'. LAW [Ed. 7], p. 2n.
Numerous authorities are collected in 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 407, 4I3. Both
English and American cases have long recognized certain e.."'\:ceptions to the
general rule of immunity. If the sovereign commences suit a defensive
counter-claim is permitted; and the sovereign can be made a party if it is
for his benefit. Strausberg v. Republic of Costa Rica, 44 L. T. R 199;
French Republic v. Island Nav. Co., 263 Fed. 410; Rowan v. Sharps' Rifle
J.°l!fg. Co., 29 Conn. 282; Id., 3I Conn. I. See also Manning v. Nicaragua,
I4 How. Pr. 5I7; llfolina v. Comisio11 Rec1tladora Del Mercado De Heneq1um,
104 A. 450.
The Italian courts were probably the first to recognize the distinction
between acts of a foreign state of a sovereign nature and those of a private
nature. The Pesaro would have been decided the same way in an Italian,
Egyptian, or Belgian court. In the Belgian court, however, there would
have been judgment but no attachment-the judgment becoming a debt
against the foreign nation. The French writers express views favorable
to the distinction of the Pesaro, regarding the acts of a sovereign state.
But the French cases are still in accord with the English rule of the Porto
Alexandre when a foreign sovereign is involved. JouRNAI. OF THE SocrE'l'Y
oF CoMPARA'l'IVE LEGISLA'l'ION (I920), Series III, Vol. II, p. 258; THE AM.
JOURNAI. OF INT. LAW (I9I9), Vol. I3, p. I2 et seq. Our Supreme Court
has never decided the question of jurisdiction in such a case, but it has
said that the question of jurisdiction under such circumstances is "debatable,"
and "It is not plain that there is an absence of jurisdiction." In re H11ssei1~
Lutfi Bey, 41 Sup Ct. 609. Now that "nationalization is in the air,'' the
·importance of the decision which our Supreme Court may be called to make
is apparent. It would be carrying a legal fiction too far if we were to say
that the immunity "by implied license" reasoning of the Exchange is applicable to a case where the foreign sovereign has engaged in an ordinary
commercial venture. The argument of "convenience" is all on the side of
the Pesaro, and it is submitted that "regal dignity" cannot be made to
suffer by such a rule. We may well expect to see the doctrine of the Pesaro
upheld.
G. S.

THE KANSAS DEcr.ARATORY JunGM.ENT ACT IN OPERA'l'ION.-Statutes of
Kansas authorized cities of the first class to carry out works of internal
improvement and provide for payment of the cost thereof by issuing bonds
of the city running no longer than ten years and bearing interest not exceeding five per cent. When conditions following the war made the marketing
of five per cent bonds impossible at a price anywhere near par, the legislature enacted a new law aut~orizing the .issuance of internal improvement
bonds at six per cent interest, but requiring every such bond to contain a
privilege of prepayment after five years from date.
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The city of Kansas City _desired to undertake some internal improvements, but the money market had so far approached normal that five per
cent bonds could be sold at a premium. The officers of the city did not
know whether the effect of the new law was to repeal the old, thus making
the prepayment privilege a necessary term in every bond to be issued, or
whether it was an additional emergency statute applying only to bonds
actually issued bearing interest above five per cent. They were anxious, if
possible, to escape the prepayment restriction, for the privilege of shorttime prepayment was shown to operate in the sale of bonds as a discount
of one-half of one per cent, which would entail a heavy loss upon the city.
The state officers, who were charged with the enforcement of the state law,
were equally anxious to prevent the city from doing this if it was in fact
illegal.
To ascertain the rights of the city in the premises the state applied to
the district court for a declaration as to the rights of the city under the
statutory restrictions imposed by the state, in an action brought against the
city for that purpose, and the court promptly declared that the old law was
not repealed and the city might issue five per cent bonds without inserting
the provision for prepayment after five years.
Justice Burch, writing the opinion of the court, makes the following
interesting comment upon the practical effectiveness of the new Declaratory
Judgment law. He says:
"The proceedings in this case serve to illusfrate the operation of the
declaratory judgment act. Execution of the city's internal-improvement
program placed it in this dilemma. If privilege of prepayment were not
written in the bonds, the city and its officers were exposed to prosecution
by the state for abuse of corporate power and violation of law, and the
securities might not be marketable. If privilege of prepayment were written in the bonds, a heavy financial burden would be placed on the taxpayers,
perhaps unnecessarily. Formerly, the city would have been compelled to
choose one course or the other and abide the consequences. The law officers
of the state could not give a binding interpretation of the statute, and,
because of its ambiguity, could not consent to the course which, the city
claimed it was authorized to pursue. Therefore, a controversy existed justiciable under the declaratory judgment act. The action was commenced in
the district court on February 7, 1922, and the defendant answered instanter.
The cause was heard on the petition and answer and a stipulation that the
pleadings stated the facts. The declaration of the district court was rendered on February 7, and the appeal was lodged in this court on February
10. This court was in session when the appeal was filed. Because of the
public importance of the question involved, the cause was advanced for
immediate hearing, and on February IO it was submitted for final decision,
on oral argument and briefs of counsel which accompanied the appeal papers.
The city may now proceed with its improvements without any of the embarrassments and without any of the delay which would have been encountered
if the remedy of declaration of right had not been available."
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'!'he case is State of Kansas v. City of Kansas City. '!'he case was
actually decided by the Supreme Court within two weeks after it was commenced in the district court. '!'he opinion was filed February 24, 1922, but
had not been published at the date of this writing.
E. R. S.

PROOF OF CHARAC'mll-BURDEN OF PROOF ON MAttER OF JusTIFICA'.l'IONA't'!ORNEVS USE oF Hrs OwN NoTEs OF THE EVIDENCE IN ARGUMENT. PmPI.E v. WII.LY, 133 N. E. 859 (kL.).-'l'he prosecution was for murder, and
one of the contentions of defendant was that his character was that of a
peaceful, law-abiding citizen, and evidence pro and con was introduced on
this issue. '!'he court of review held that character can be evidenced by
general reputation only. '!'his suggests an old contention, the history of
which is well sketched by Professor Wigmore. W1GMORE ON EVIDENCE,
Sec. l~l et seq. '!'he opinion in R. v. Rowton, Leigh & C. 520, is largely
responsible for the propagation if not the initiation of the heresy, opposed
not only to well-established authority but in violation of common sense, to
the effect that character cannot be evidenced by the testimony of persons
speaking out of intimate knowledge of the character to be evidenced. '!'his
heresy spread to this country, and the court doubtless speaks correctly when
it says that the great weight of authority supports it. '!'his doctrine is particularly pernicious in its application to the evidence of character introduced
by the defendant as evidence of his innocence, since here it loses the principal prop in its support, namely, that it takes the person whose character
is involved by "unfair surprise." '!'he contrary doctrine has the better reason and more than casual authority in its support, and by reason of its
"sweet reasonableness" should win general allegiance in the long run. See
Trial of Cowper et al., 13 How. ST. '!'RIALS, n8o; Thomas Hardy's Trial,
24 :{{ow. ST. '!'RIALS, 999; People v. Wade, II8 Calif. 672; Stamper v. GrH!in,
12 Ga. 453; Bowlus v. State, 130 Ind. 227, and State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa 18o,
among many others which might be cited.
'!'he evidence in the case left no chance for doubt of the killing by
defendant, but there was a sharp conflict on the question of whether the
killing was justified. '!'he court, while applying a modified form of it,
affirmed the rule to be that the burden of proof on the question of justification is with the defendant. '!'his again presents no new contention and
illustrates anew what is sure to happen when courts brush aside logic and
precedent in the interest of the individual. It may be quite true that many
changes ought to be made in the rules of evidence, and sometqing of an
argument made even for plenary discretion in the trial court over all questions of admissibility. If, however, we are to have rules of evidence we
should not cease to plead that they be consistent with our rules of substantive law and logical in their application. If we are going to say that one
should not be found guilty until every reasonable doubt of his guilt has
been removed, we must say that if there is a reasonable doubt of whether
the defendant killed in self-defense he must be acquitted. And yet the
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rule as stated by the court in the opinion under discussion, by putting the
burden of this issue upon the defendant, would allow the jury to find guilt,
though it was unable to say that the killing was not justified. We must
concede great conflict in the authorities here, much of it evidently resulting
from loose thinking upon what is meant by "burden of proof." The modification of the rule as applied by the court would relieve the defendant from
this burden whenever the evidence of the state shows that defendant claimed
to act in self-defense. The rule in each of its forms has the considerable
support of courts entitled to respect. vVe have it, (a) a reasonable doubt
as to whether defendant acted in self-defense requires an acquittal; (b)
unless there is a preponderance of evidence in favor of defendant's contention that he acted in self-defense he should be convicted; and (c), where
there is no reasonable doubt but that defendant did the killing the burden
is on him to produce a preponderance of evidence to show that the killing
was in self-defense, unless_ the evidence of the state discloses that the defendant claims to have acted in self-defense, when the contrary would be true.
The court applied the rule as last stated upon the authority of State v.
Patterson, 45 Vt. 3o8, 12 Am. Rep. 200, without, singularly enough, making
any reference to Alesander v. People, 96 lll. 96, or Kipley v. People, 215
Ill. 358, both of which are precisely in point. Conflict cannot be eliminated
by detailed discussion of the cases. An excellent resume of them up to the
time of its publication can be found! in a note to Com. v. Palmer, 222 Pa.
299, as reported in 19 L. R. A. (n. s.) 483. In the abstract, no rule can be
right which is wrong in principle, and if it be the law that guilt cannot be
found without conviction of it beyond a reasonable doubt, then the rule
applied by the court, which allows it to be done, is wrong.
It may not be quite without justification to refer to the holding of the
court that it was error to allow the state's attorney, in his argument to the
jury, to refer to and read notes of evidence made by him during the trial.
There was no contention that the attorney made any other claim than that
he was giving his recollection of the evidence as refreshed by his notes.
That so common, and may it be said so reasonable, a practice should vitiate
a trial isi but to stimulate a practice so loose as to encourage the assignment
of almost any triviality as error.
V. H. L.
ST~Ts-STA'.ruTORY D:ei>ICATION-VACATION AND REvmtTER..-The common law dedication of a street confers on the public a right of user in the
nature of an easement. The "fee" of the street continues in the dedicator;
he may erlj oy and use it in any manner not inconsistent with street uses;
if the street is vacated or abandoned he enjoys it, as originally, free from
the burden of public rights. TIFFANY, REA!, PROPERTY (Ed. 2), § 486; Dn.LON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Ed. 5), § 1076. But if the dedicator transfers a lot or block abutting on the street, his conveyance is presumed to
carry the title to the center of the street. TIFFANY, op. cit., § 446; 3 KENT,
CoMMENTARIES, 433. "The effect thus given to conveyances * * * is based
not only on the presumption that the parties intend the ownership thereof
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to be vested in the person who is alone, usually, in a position to make use
of it, and who probably will need to do so, but also * * * upon the ground
of public policy which renders it desirable to prevent the existence of small
strips of land * * * the title to which may remain in abeyance for many
years, and which may then be asserted merely in order to harass the owner
of the adjoining land" (T111FANY, op. cit., § 445-language used in another
connection, but equally applicable here). The net result of this presumption
and of the rules as to ownership above stated is that in the usual case the
owners of abutting land, and not the dedicator of the street, reap the practical fruits of its vacation or abandonment. Er.I.IOTT, ROADS AND S'tREE'l'S
(Ed. 2), §§ 885, 886.
Many of our western and mid-western states have adopted legislation
authorizing what is commonly called "statutory dedication." This form
of dedication does ·not supplant the common law method, but rather furnishes a more formal way of indicating the intent to dedicate. TIFFANY,
§ 482. The dedication statutes usually provide that an owner may devote
property to the public use for streets, alleys, parks, etc., by duly executing
and recording a plat upon which are shown the strips and tracts intended
for these purposes. I1i most j21risdictio1is the statute is so phrased, Cox v.
L. & N. R. R., 48 Ind. 178, 181; Bradley v. Spoka1w, etc:, R. Co., 79 Wash.
455; or is rather questionably construed in such a way (Schiirmeier v. R.R.
IO Minn. 59, 77; Betcher v. R.R .., no Minn. 228; Snoddy v. Bolen, 122 Mo.
479, 491; Hatton v. St. Louis, 264 Mo. 634, 643; Leadville v. Bohn Mining
Co., 37 Colo. 248; Oli1i v. R. R., 25 Colo. 177; Sowadski v. Salt Lake Co.,
36 Utah 177; Donovaii v. Albert, 11 N. D. 28g, 292; Kimball v. Kenosha, 4
Wis. 321) as to be in effect declaratory of common law principles, so that
the title to streets dedicated thereunder and the reverter of the same upon
vacation or abandonment are governed by the rules heretofore stated. In
Iowa and Nebraska the public is held to have a fee simple absolute; there
is no reverter at all when a street is vacated. Dempsey v. Biirlingto1i1 66
Ia. 687; Lake City v. Fiilkerso1i1 122 Ia. 569; Wahoo v. Nethaway, 73 Neb.
54; Carroll v. Elmwood, 88 Neb. 352. But see Kenwood Park v. Leo1wrd,
177 Ia. 337.
The Illinois statute provides that "The acknowledgment and recording
of such plat shall be held * * * to be a conveyance in fee simple of such
portions of the premises platted as are marked or noted on such plat as
donated or granted to the public * *. And the premises intended for any
street, alley, way, common or other public use in any city, village or town,
or addition thereto, shall be held in the corporate name thereof in trust to
and for the uses and purposes set forth or intended." Rev. Stats. 1913, Ch.
109, § 3. The Illinois supreme court has again and again held that the city
has a base or determinable fee in streets dedicated under this statute. Gebhardt v. Reeves, 76 Ill. 301; Prall v. Biirckhartt (111.), 132 N. E. 281. The
same view is suggested in Kimball v. Kenosha, 4 Wis. 321; Sowadski v.
Salt Lake Co., 36 Utah 127; Cullen v. Elec. Light Co., 66 Oh. St. 166.
Upon this construction, the platter retains a possibility of reverter in the
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street expectant upon the termination of the fee in the municipality. Such
a "mere possibility" is personal to the grantor and his heirs, according to
general principles, and is inalienable (TIFFANY, § 132) ; and even if a possibility of reverter be regarded as alienable, there is a real logical difficulty
about holding a mere right of this character to be embraced by implication
in a conveyance of land abutting on the street in which the contingent
interest exists. Apparently we are driven to the conclusion that the original
platter or his heirs, and not the abutting owner, is entitled to a vacated
street. And yet, although several states have statutes similar in substance
to the one quoted above, Illinois has been alone in arriving at the conclusion
indicated. (Compare cases from Minnesota, Missouri, Colorado, etc., above,
which escape this result by construing a statutory dedication as equivalent
to a common law dedication; also Pettingill v. Levin, 35 Ia. 344, 355, where
the public fee is held to be absolute; and Traction Co. v. Parish, 67 Oh. St.
l8I, 190, where the public is said to have a base fee (as in Illinois), but the
possibility of reverter passes by implication with abutting land.) Whatever
may be said for the Illinois construction, as a matter of logic, there can be
no doubt of its inconvenience. Every reason for presuming that a grant
of land along a common law street carries to the center thereof applies with
full force here. It makes no difference, from thet viewpoint of public policy,
' whether the objectionable "small strips of land," title to which "may remain
in abeyance for :inany years," and which are severed in ownership from the
abutting lots with which alone they can be used and enjoyed, are created
under a common law dedication or under a statutory dedication.
Doubtless moved by just these considerations and by a desire to avoid
a result like that reached in the early Illinois cases, the legislatures of Illinois (1851) and of other states in which statutory dedication is recognized
have passed later statutes declaring that the abutter and not the original
platter is entitled to a vacated street. Drr,r.oN, § n6o, p. 1845. The Illinois
Vacation Act provides that when any street is vacated "the lot or tract of
land immediately adjoining on either side shall extend to the center line"
thereof. Rev. St. Ill. 1913, Ch. 145, sec. 2. In H el11~ v. Webster, 85 Ill. n6,
this statute was held unconstitutional as applied to a street previously dedicated, for the reason that the possibility of reverter was a property right
of which the legislature could not lawfully deprive the platter. The language of the court was sufficiently broad to include dedications made either
before or after the passage of the Vacation Act. Expressions of similar
tenor and effect were used in several earlier and several later cases (all
cited and discussed in Prall v. Burckhartt, sitpra) ; these expressions have
been quite generally assumed to represent the law in Illinois. DILLON, §
n6o (p. 1845, note 4); KALES, EsTA'l'ES AND Fu~ IN'n:~S'l'S (Ed. 2), §
293. Such a view, if adhered to, was, however, most unfortunate, as it not
only established the inconvenient rule that streets dedicated by plat revert
to the platter upon being vacated, but it placed that rule beyond legislative
power of correction. (For an excellent discussion of the Illfoois cases see
KALES, SltPra, §§ 283-293.)
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It is, therefore, very interesting to find that in a· recent case, Prall v.
Burcklzartt, I32 N. E. 28I, the supreme court of Illinois expressly sustains
the Vacation Act as to streets subsequently dedicated: "The provisions of
the Plat Act and the Vacation Act heretofore referred to were both then
in force and must be construed iii pari materia, and it would seem to follow
that appellee, in making and recording the plat of 188g, must be held to
have done so in contemplation not only of the Plat Act but also of the
Vacation Act." The court did not find it necessary in Prall v. Burckhartt
to overrule earlier cases dealing with dedications made prior to the Vacation Act, but the whole of the opinion would indicate that the court is prepared to overrule them; it dilates upon the fact that the rule of stai·e decisis
is based on expediency and should not be allowed to outweigh greater evils
which will result from continuing in force an erroneous rule of law; it
argues emphatically the impolicy of the view which gives the vacated street
to the original platter; and says that a mere possibility of reverter is not
property within the scope and meaning of the due process clause. (Compare
cases sustaining statutes which alter or abolish existing inchoate dower
rights, TIFFANY, § 230). But whether or not the earlier cases still hold in
regard to dedications made before the Vacation Act, there can certainly be
no objection to the decision of Prall v. Burckhartt on its facts; it brings
the law of Illinois into harmony with the rules prevailing in all other
jurisdictions.
B. S.

"UNFAIR METHODS oF CoMPE'l'I'l'ION"-Tm~ FEDERAi, TRADE COMMISSION
AC'l'.-"Unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared
unlawful." 38 Stat. L. 7I7. This is the vital portion of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The discussions in the United States Senate attendant
upon the passage of this measure reveal that there was scarcely any agreement among its supporters as to what the words "unfair methods of competition" meant. Apparently the only harmony in the expressed views was
that the term used was to have a broader significance than the expression
"unfair competition" had at common law. 25 YALE L. J. 20. This lack of
agreement precluded a resort to the Congressional proceedings as an aid
to interpreting the statute, further, perhaps, than to find an intent to broaden
the conception of unfair trade at common law. Indeed, what authoritative
comment there was was equally as indefinite as the final enactment. Put
forth into a field where the common law was at best uncertain and still in
a formative stage, there is little wonder that those authorities who ventured
to express an opinion upon the meaning of the statute, quite as uncertain,
should have been in marked disagreement. While the conception of what
was unfair in competition for quite some time had been narrow, being limited to cases of "passing off," later cases extended the doctrine so much
that it is safe to say that without the aid of the present statute the courts
would soon have arrived at the stage where they now are with its assist-
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See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215;
CoL. L. Rev. 328.
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"The words 'unfair methods of competition in commerce' include little
if anything more than the words 'attempt to monopolize' as used in section
two of the Sherman Act" HARLAN AND McCANDI.ESS, FSDERAI. TRADE CoM1111ss10N, § 26. Another view includes this, and also unfair competition as
defined in the more orthodox common law decisions. 19 CoL, L. Rsv. 266,
note 2, where both ideas are rebutted. "The law itself is mainly declaratory
of a new ethical code in business dealings." HARVEY AND BRADFORD, MA.NuAi OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 13+ "It [this actl was intended to
prohibit and prevent those classes of acts which, for want of a better term,
may be described as economically unfair. In an economic sense, fair competition signifies a competition of economic and productive efficiency."
STEVENS, UNFAIR CoMPSTITION, pp. 4 and 5. Sufficient decisions have been
rendered by the federal courts to justify the statement that none of these
views has been followed by them.
In 63 THI~ ANNAI.S 3, a writer advances this: "No unfair or dishonest
practice will long survive the condemnation of men engaged in that trade.
The men engaged in business make the rules of the game, legislatures and
courts to the contrary notwithstanding. The most that legislative bodies
can do is to write into statute law more or less imperfectly what the great
body of business men regard as the approved rules of practice among intelligent and high-minded business men." The cases decided under. the Federal Trade Commission Act indicate that the federal courts have taken cognizance-more or less unconsciously, it is true-of "what the great body
of business men regard as the approved rules of practice among intellige_nt
and high-minded business men" written into statute law more or less imperfectly by the national Congress. Confronted with a statute without ambiguity
in the true sense of the term. but unquestionably vague and indefinite, and
deprived of any helpful extraneous aid to interpret it, the courts have given
it a meaning not differing from the natural meaning of the words "unfair
methods of competition," agreeably to approved standards of statutory construction. United States v. Col. & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed. 321. If these
words have a natural meaning, it would include those practices which a
business man of morality and intelligence would condemn. Many practices
approved by him as fair and moral would undoubtedly violate the better
rules of economics, and would be denominated "economically unfair." Most
practices which would naturally lead to monopoly it is believed the same
individual would instinctively condemn, likewise those that were denominated unfair at common law. This conception includes, but is broader than,
all those which the authorities cited above suggest, save that from STEVENS,
UNFAIR CoMPSTITION, and HARVEY AND BRADFORD, MANUAL oF FEDERAL TRADs
COMMISSION. What the business sense of the quality of any competitive
act is it is of course a matter of evidence to prove; many cases are to be
found in which the courts have taken judicial notice, apparently, of the
moral worth of trade practices, as view~d by men _of business. See N. J.
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Asbestos Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, infra. To save from the charge
of inconsistency, it should be remarked that while the statute is referred to
above as being vague and indefinite, and then later it is said that it has a
clear meaning, that latter statement is to be taken in the light of the decisions rendered under the act Moreover, paradoxical as it may seem, words
which are in common legal use may be both dear and indefinite-dear in
the subjective sense, but incapable of any exact and comprehensive definition in other words. The terms "reasonable doubt" and "fraud" are examples.
The following decisions are not inconsistent with the views expressed.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, a dealer in steel ties
used for bundling bales of cotton manufactured by a certain company
refused to sell them unless the purchaser bought a certain proportional
amount of jute bagging, used to wrap bales of cotton, which was manufactured by another company. In refusing to classify this as an unfair method
of competition, the court said: "The words 'unfair methods of competition'
are not defined by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. They
are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed
to good morals,. because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or
oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency
unduly to hinder competition or created monopoly. The act was certainly
not intended to fetter free and fair comPetltion as commonly understood
and practiced by ho11orable opponents in trade." In Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 270 Fed. 881, the publishing company distributed its publications to the public through a selling organization composed of distributing agents and salesboys, the latter selling to the public
the periodicals received from the distributing agents. These agents agreed
not to wholesale the periodicals of other publishers without the consent of
the Curtis Publishing Company. This was held not to be an unfair method
of competition. In discussing this phrase, this language is used: "Indeed,
in the nature of things, it was impossible to describe and define in advance
just what constituted unfair competition, and in the final analysis it became
a question of law, after the facts were ascertained, whether such facts constitute unfair competition in business, for the test of fairness, as of fraud,
is the application by the law of moral standards to the actions of 111m."
(Italics in both quotations are the writer's.) Again, in N. J. Asbestos Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 509, the facts were that a manufacturing company made a practice of entertaining employes of its customers
with liquors, cigars, meals, theater tickets, etc. Since this method of promoting business had been an "incident of business from time immemorial,"
it was concluded that it was not a method of unfair competition.
One of the latest pronouncements upon this subject is found in KinneyRome Co. v. Federal Trade Commissio1i, 275 Fed. 665. A manufacturer
gave premiums to salesmen of retailers, with their knowledge and consent,
to induce their salesmen to push the sale of the manufacturer's goods. The
Federal Trade Commission conceived this to be unfair. It was held to be
otherwise in the circuit court of appeals. There must be some fraud in
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trade injuring a competitor or lessening competition before a trade practice
can be considered as unfair. Since the retailer acquiesced in the practice,
it was equivalent to his act. Competitors of the manufacturer could not
complain, because any plan to advance the sale of one kind of goods and
to keep back another was a matter wholly within the control of the merchant. The public's interest was in competition among merchants, not in
competition among goods in any one merchant's shop. If there was any
tendency on the part of clerks to take extreme .measures to induce the public
to purchase these particular goods, this was what the public expected of
every merchant whose interest it might be to develop the sale of one class
of goods in preference to another. While no attempt was made to define
"unfair methods of competition,'' the attitude of the court seems to be that
of a dealer whose competitor adopts an internal trade policy to promote
the sale of a certain commodity, and who would not denounce such tactics
as unfair or immoral, but would recognize in them a shrewd bit of business, to be met by increased competitive effort on his part,-a rational construction of the statute, giving the terms used their natural meaning. What
was allowed here was economically unfair, in that there was no competition
of productive efficiency. If effective in increasing the sales of the manufacturer's product, this practice might also tend to monopoly, if financially
weaker competitors could not meet this kind of competition. This decision
gives little support to the "economically unfair" and the "attempt to monopolize" constructions. In Westen~ Sugar Refining Co. v. Federal Trade
Commissio1i, 275 Fed. 725, a conspiracy among jobbers to prevent manufacturers from selling directly to a wholesaler was condemned as unfair.
"Unfair methods of competition" naturally embraces this method of seeking
commercial advantage. In Sears, Roebieck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 "Fed. 307, a mail order house doing an interstate business was
restrained from advertising that it had obtained special price concessions
and could sell much cheaper than its competitors, and that it purchased
selected brands of certain commodities from abroad. Both of these representations were false. The deception practiced on the public and the discredit cast upon competitors influenced the court to make this decision.
·This was clearly a case where a business man of integrity (though such
advertising has been not unusual) would call such tactics unfair. In commenting upon the act the court said: "On the face of the statute the legislative intent is apparent. The commissioners, representing the government
as parens patriae, are to exercise their common sense, as informed by their
general idea of unfair trade at common law, and stop all those trade practices that have a capacity or tendency to injure competitors directly or
through deception of purchasers, quite irrespective of whether the specific
practices in question have been denounced in common law cases." Apparently it is not intended to limit the operation of tli.e act to a condemnation
of practices known as unfair at common law, but rrl,erely to use that as a
starting point, or a minimum, and to extend the act to embrace any methods
of competition that a natural construction will permit. If the orthodox
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rule of the common law of unfair trade is referred to as being the standard
of interpretation to be used in construing the act, the methods employed
would not constitute unfair practice. NIMS, UNFAIR BUSINESS COMPETITION,
§ 14- If the idea of unfair competition at common law is as expressed by
way of dict1t1n in Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 Fed.
244, that an act that is immoral is usually· unfair, this is in accord with the
underlying theory of the cases decided under the act, but it is not in harmony with the common law understanding of unfair competition.
One decision is apparently in conflict with this view-Winsted Hosiery
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 Fed. 957. A manufacturer of underwear, shirts and hosiery labeled these articles as composed of "wool" and
"merino" when they contained much cotton. The common law conception
of unfair trade was applied to these acts, and according to the court's theory
there was nothing unfair practiced upon competitors, and an injunction was
denied. This action might be regarded as unfair competition at common
law, because it enabled the sale of the inferior as the superior article, engendering an unequal competition, since the truthful trader selling the genuine
article, or the truthful trader selling the same article that the defendant
sold, labeled correctly, could not attempt to compete with him on a basis of
equality. It is not far removed from the practice of "passing off" and what
was condemned in International News Service v. Associated Press, supra.
It was also said that the act was conceived to be designed for the purpose
of protecting competitors and not the public. In holding that the act was
not intended to protect the public, this decision is at variance with all other
decisions under the act, especially Federal Trade Commissio1i v. Gratz, 258
Fed. 314, holding that the commission is to interpose only in the interest of
public. As this controlled the decision, it cannot be taken as seriously
opposed to the cases, supra, on the question as to what constitutes unfair
competition within the meaning of the statute.
However the results achieved by the courts in interpreting the statute
may have differed from the intention which Congress wished to express in
enacting the measure, the interpretation given it by the courts is sound front
a legal point of view. If the Congress is disappointed in the trend of the
decisions, it must express itself more explicitly.
G. E. L.

